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1 Introduction 
“The rules of the game have changed forever … Professionals everywhere, from China to 
Costa Rica, can work from home as if they were in offices next door to each other …  which 
requires us to run faster in order to stay in the same place…” Friedman (2005, cover) 
 
The above quote is taken from Thomas Friedman’s book the world is flat, which has 
been a bestseller since it appeared in 2005. The remarkable success of the book 
reflects to a certain extent the present fears with respect to increasing globalization. 
Using many examples, Friedman argues that distance (however defined) is no longer 
a dominant characteristic of the world economy, or will cease to be so in the very near 
future. Competition is thought to be a race to the bottom, with the lowest-wage 
countries as the big winners. It seems almost commonly accepted knowledge that the 
world is getting smaller in an economic sense. The ICT revolution only just started, 
and communication with people on the other side of the globe has become a trivial 
exercise. The ease with which international communications can be established, has 
convinced some researchers that “distance” is becoming less important than it used to 
be. The term distance should be viewed as a general concept, not only related to 
transportation costs, but also reflecting differences in language, culture, religion, legal 
systems, etc. All these factors might make trading relations more difficult. According 
to ICT-optimists, such as Cairncross (2001 – also a New York Times bestseller) these 
differences will disappear or become far less important than they currently are. 
 
In a broad sense, there seem to be two groups of distance-researchers, namely (i) the  
“death of distance” group, which argues that the location of economic activity 
becomes rapidly less important, and (ii) the “not so fast” group, which focuses on 
evidence to determine the extent to which distance still matters in the world economy. 
As a representative of the death-of-distance group Thomas Friedman provides many 
anecdotes to convince the reader how small the world has become. Few people, for 
example, realize that when ordering a burger in a drive-in at McDonalds, one might 
actually talk to someone in India. As a representative of the not-so-fast group, 
Feenstra (1998) provides another anecdote. The production cost of a Barbie doll is 
$1,-, but it sells for about $10,- in the USA. This implies that the cost of 
transportation, marketing, and retailing have an ad valorem tax equivalent of 900 
percent. In a long and careful survey Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) conclude 
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that this so-called tax equivalent of trade costs for industrialized countries is 170 
percent. This is much smaller than the Barbie doll example suggests, but still 
remarkably high.2 In related macro-monetary economic literature, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000) point out six major macro-economic puzzles, all based on the 
relevance of trade barriers. 
 
We illustrate the apparent consequences of trade barriers, whatever their origin. We 
therefore do not measure distance costs as such (see Anderson and Van Wincoop, 
2004, or Anderson and Neary, 2006) but focus on the consequences of these costs, 
thus illustrating how barriers to trade shape the world economy. We do so by showing 
that up to the present there is no such thing as a “great global equalizer”. Income per 
capita levels vary greatly across the globe, with only little indication that this situation 
will change soon. This is an important observation, because neo-classical trade theory 
predicts that factor prices – income per capita – will be equalized if only free trade 
would exist.3 If this is not the case it could be a sign of trade barriers. This is the next 
step in this paper. We show that indeed geographical trade and investment patterns 
illustrate the (growing?) importance of “distance”. In contrast to Friedman’s main line 
of thought, we argue that: “the world is not flat, nor is distance dead.” Our findings 
are in accordance with McCann (2008), who argues that: “it is possible to reconcile 
all of the seemingly conflicting evidence by adopting the argument that the global 
economy simultaneously exhibits trends towards both increasing globalization and 
localization.” The latter is tied to: “Cities [..which..] are increasingly seen to be the 
critical context for growth.”  
 
The set-up of this paper is as follows. We take Friedman (2005) seriously and discuss 
a number of his key propositions, which are: we have to “Run faster to stay in the 
same place” (cover), competition creates “a more level playing field” (p. 52), the 
revolution in transport technology results in a world  “without regard to geography” 
(p. 176), which also implies that “small companies could suddenly see around the 
world” (p. 143). According to us these statements capture the main message of 
Friedman’s The World is Flat (2005).  The key idea seems to be twofold: first, various 
                                                 
2 This number breaks down as follows: 21% transportation costs, 44% border related trade barriers, and 
55% retail and distribution costs – so, 1+1.7= 1.21*1.44* 1.55. Measuring trade costs, however, is far 
from trivial. Anderson and Neary (2005) develop index numbers to measure trade restrictiveness.  
3 This is known as the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) theorem in standard trade theories. 
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barriers (to trade or factor mobility) that previously protected markets from 
competition have either vanished or declined. Second, such a reduction in barriers 
automatically implies an increase in competition – or in the contestability of markets 
and hence has the potential to bring about income convergence. 
 
Section 2 discusses (per capita) income developments since 1950 by investigating 
(changes in) the extent of income dispersion and income convergence in relation to 
the size of different economies. Section 3 focuses on changes in income inequality 
since 1950. Section 4 discusses leapfrogging (which country is in the lead and which 
country is lagging behind) and convergence from a longer perspective (2000 years). 
Section 5 analyzes the relationship between distance and international trade, while 
section 6 focuses on investment flows and production networks. Section 7, finally, 
concludes. 
 
2 Income developments since 1950 
The primary objective of our paper is to establish empirically whether or not the 
(economic) earth is becoming “flat”, that is whether or not the death-of-distance 
group referred to in the introduction is right that the location of economic activity is 
becoming less important, such that indeed income earners in the OECD countries 
have to “run faster” than competitors in order to “stay in the same place”. This 
citation suggests that the threat from countries like India or China is such that income 
levels in OECD countries might even fall relative to the new giants. Given the 
attention views like this receive from policy makers and in the press one likes to know 
whether these claims have a factual basis. To answer this question, we use several 
methods and data sets in different periods of time, as explained below. 
 
2.1 Income levels 
We start off with a discussion of the economic developments since the second half of 
the 20th century in sections 2 and 3, going back further in time in section 4.4 
                                                 
4 Throughout sections 2-4 we use Angus Maddison’s magnificent, recently updated data set comprising 
all countries in the world, as described in Maddison (2007). Maddison’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) estimates are denoted in so-called 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars (GK$), which is 
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) converters rather than exchange rates to correct for price 
differences between countries. Without such corrections, the income levels of developing countries 
would be grossly underestimated relative to the income levels in the OECD countries. The PPP 
corrections are based on the International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations, Eurostat, 
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For the period 1950-2003, we have detailed annual information available regarding 
population and income for 137 countries and 8 regions (groups of smaller countries), 
together constituting the entire world, see Table A.2 in the Appendix. The most 
important, and by far largest, “region” consists of the “former USSR” group of 
countries. The population size of these 145 entities differs enormously, ranging from a 
low of 80 thousand for the Seychelles to a high of 1.29 billion for China. The same 
holds for income levels of the 145 countries / regions, ranging from a low of $ 0.2 
billion for São Tomé and Principe to a high of $ 8,341 bn. for the USA. Since our 
main question to be answered regarding the economic “flatness” of the world is based 
on competition at the individual level, we will mostly focus on the ratio of income and 
population by discussing developments in income per capita. This does not imply that 
size is unimportant (see below). The average income per capita level for the 145 
countries / regions in 2003 is $ 6,843 with a low of $ 212 for Congo Dem. Rep. 
(Zaire) and a high of $ 29,037 for the USA (137 times the Zaire level). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of income per capita for a selection of years 
(equally spaced across time) in the period 1950-2003 by providing a histogram with 
the natural logarithm of income per capita on the horizontal axis (to compactify the 
range) and the number of countries within a certain range on the vertical axis. In 
1950, for example, 1 country (Guinea Bissau) has ln(income per capita) below 5.7 (= 
income level of $ 300) whereas 7 countries are in the range between 5.7 and 6.0, and 
so on. The panels of Figure 1 show a gradual movement from the left to the right, 
indicating increasing income per capita levels for most countries. Note, that we 
discuss absolute income changes, not relative positions. Clearly, as noted above, there 
is considerable variation in income per capita. It is hard to determine any trends in the 
panels of the figure by visual inspection, although comparing the first panel (with 
most of the mass on the left hand side) with the last panel (where the mass is more 
evenly distributed) seems to suggest an increase (rather than a decrease) in income 
dispersion. The graphs suggest a crude answer to the citation at the start of the paper. 
                                                                                                                                            
and OECD, as initiated by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982). Maddison uses the Geary-Khamis 
technique to ensure transitivity, base country invariance, and additivity of the data. All GDP data 
estimates discussed in sections 2-5 are denoted in GK$ and referred to as income. To put the GK$ into 
proper perspective, Maddison’s estimate of income per capita in the USA in 2003 is GK$ 29,037 
compared to the World Bank’s $37,600 current international PPP dollars. This implies that the (1990) 
GK$ used in this paper is about 30 percent more valuable than 2003 international US PPP dollars. We 
will refer to GK$ as $ in the remainder of the paper. 
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Figure 1 Histogram of per capita income, selected years 
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); income per capita in GK$; 145 countries / regions; 
horizontal spacing = 0.3; countries in the extremes are listed; see the main text for further details. 
 
Observation 1 (economic growth): 
Most countries do not stay in the same place as far as absolute income per capita is 
concerned. More importantly, income dispersion has increased between 1950-2003.  
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Figure 2 Income convergence, 1950-2003 
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); income per capita in GK$; 145 countries / regions; 
the horizontal line is a regression line. 
 
2.2 Size matters 
It is time to proceed with a more formal analysis. If the world is becoming 
economically flat and fierce competition between workers, doing more or less the 
same tasks in different parts of the world, this should ensure that minuscule 
differences in wage rates disappear. This can be done through trade in tradable 
commodities, labour migration or through the location decisions of firms. In all these 
cases competition should result in a tendency for income levels of similar workers to 
become more equal over time, that is, these income levels should “converge”.  
 
Figure 2 gives a standard answer whether or not this is the case, see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) for a detailed explanation. The figure shows on the horizontal axis the 
(natural logarithm of) initial income levels for the various countries in 1950. On the 
vertical axis it shows the annualized per capita income growth rate for these countries 
in the period 1950 – 2003. The line through the scatter plot shows a regression line, 
which is almost horizontal (slightly upward sloping). This is problematic for the 
convergence hypothesis because countries with low initial levels of income should 
grow faster than countries with initially high levels of income in order to converge. 
Evidently, Figure 2 does not support this hypothesis.  
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Table 1 Convergence; regressions for 1950-2003 
Dependent variable: annualized per capita economic growth rate 
Explanatory var 1950-1963 1963-1976 1976-1989 1989-2003 1950-2003 
Constant 0.020 -0.004 0.019 -0.026 0.017 
(t-stat) (1.750) (-0.279) (1.111) (-1.728) (1.722) 
Initial income# 0.001 0.004* -0.002 0.005* 0.000 
(t-stat) (0.484) (2.103) (-0.797) (2.480) (0.036) 
R2 0.002 0.030 0.004 0.041 0.000 
Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); 145 countries / regions. 
# ln(initial income per capita); * income effect significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 1 reports simple regressions of the annual economic growth rate of a country / 
region in a specified (sub-)period on the natural logarithm of initial income per capita. 
If there is convergence, one expects initially poor countries to grow faster than 
initially rich countries, so the reported coefficient on initial income in Table 1 should 
be negative and statistically significant. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on 
initial income level for the sub-periods is either not statistically significant or point at 
income divergence, rather than convergence (for the sub-periods 1963-1976 and 
1989-2003, respectively). For the period as a whole, the effect of initial income on 
economic growth is nil. Moreover, the explanatory power of the regression (R2, the 
“explained” share of the variance in the economic growth rate) is very poor for the 
various sub-periods (no more than 4.1 percent) and nil for the period as a whole. 
Although there is an important caveat to this analysis to be discussed below, the 
following conclusion is warranted: 
 
Observation 2 (no convergence) 
The impression from Figure 1, that there is no support for global convergence, is 
supported by a more formal analysis of the data.  
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Figure 3 Country size, initial income level, and economic growth, 1950-2003 
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b. Country size, initial income, and economic growth, 1963-76
bubble size proportional to population in 1963
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Figure 3 continued 
c. Country size, initial income, and economic growth, 1976-89
bubble size proportional to population in 1976
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d. Country size, initial income, and economic growth, 1989-2003
bubble size proportional to population in 1989
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); 145 countries and regions 
 
The various panels of Figure 3 illustrate that Figure 2 and Table 1 can be misleading 
regarding the developments in the world economy because all countries are equally 
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important, independent of the size of the economy.5 This makes an observation for the 
Seychelles (with 80 thousand inhabitants in 2003) as important as an observation for 
China (with a 16,000 times larger population in 2003). Similarly, 13 countries have a 
population less than 0.1 percent of the Chinese population, with a total of 8.4 million 
people (less than 0.7 percent of China’s population). Nonetheless, In Figure 2 the 
annual observations for these 13 countries receive a weight 13 times higher than 
China’s single annual observation in the analysis in sections 2 and 3.6 Figure 3 vividly 
illustrates the repercussions of these observations for the sub-period regressions 
summarized in Table 1 using a “bubble” diagram which shows the natural logarithm 
of initial income per capita of each country on the horizon axis, the annual economic 
growth rate of the country on the vertical axis, and depicts the country’s importance 
by making the size of the bubble proportional to the size of the initial population. 
 
In view of the size of their populations, China and India are the most important, 
separately identified observations in Figure 3. Of the high income countries, we 
separately identify Japan, the USA, and the (former) USSR. In the first two periods 
(panels 3a and 3b; the period 1950-1976) economic growth in China and India (the 
largest poor countries) tends to be lower (or at least not higher) than in Japan, the 
USA, and the USSR (the largest high income countries). By contrast, in the last two 
periods (panels 3c and 3d; the period 1976-2003), economic growth in China and 
India tends to be higher than in Japan, the USA, and the (former) USSR, particularly 
in the most recent period. So, the relative income position, or ranking, indeed 
changes. The figure therefore shows that the largest developing countries have grown 
substantially faster in the last 25 years than the largest high income countries. This 
brings us to observation 3. 
 
Observation 3 (importance of China and India): 
The population size of China and India – together about 37 percent of the world 
population – combined with relatively high growth rates ensures that in the last 25 
years there is some evidence for global income convergence. Correcting for country 
                                                 
5 This remark also holds for more sophisticated analyses of income inequality, like the famous σ and β 
convergence concepts of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).  
6 Again similarly, 83 countries have a population smaller than 1 percent of the Chinese population in 
2003, with a total of 452 million people (less than 35 percent of China’s population). 
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size therefore lends support to Thomas Friedman’s claim that global income per 
capita levels have started to converge recently, and relative income positions indeed 
change. 
 
3 Income inequality 
Section 2 has studied income levels and economic growth rates, but not income 
inequality directly. We now analyze this aspect in more detail. There are various 
methods to determine income inequality. We will use the popular method of drawing 
Lorenz curves and calculating the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz curve is obtained by 
ranking the countries in terms of income per capita from low to high, then calculating 
the cumulative share of world population and income (which therefore ignores 
income inequality within countries) and finally plotting the result in a graph. Figure 4 
depicts two Lorenz curves for the years 1973 and 2003. In the year 2003 figure 4 
shows, for example, that 74.2 percent of the world population earned 34.9 percent of 
the world income. If income levels across countries would have been the same 
throughout the world, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the diagonal. The 
deviation of the Lorenz curve from the diagonal is therefore a measure of income 
inequality. This statistic is called the Gini-coefficient. It ranges from 0 (perfect 
equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).  
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Figure 4 Global income inequality; Lorenz curves in 1973 and 2003 
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); 145 countries and regions; The range “China and 
India” in 1973 includes Uganda. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, China and India, with their large populations, were among the 
poorest countries in the world in 1973. Since then, the rapid economic development of 
India (since about 1990) and particularly of China (since about 1980) has 
fundamentally influenced the global Lorenz curve, bringing it closer to the diagonal 
and therefore reducing global income inequality. Moreover, it is clear from the figure 
that the share of income going to the high-income countries is about the same in 1973 
and 2003. In fact, throughout the period 1950-2003 the top 15 percent of the 
population earns about half of world income.7  
 
                                                 
7 Details available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 5 Global income inequality (Gini coefficients and income dispersion) 
Global income inequality; Gini coefficients (LHS) 
and income dispersion (RHS), 1950-2003
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); income dispersion = standard deviation of 
ln(income per capita) for 145 countries / regions. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the global Gini coefficient from 1950 to 2003 as well 
as a measure of income dispersion (the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of 
income per capita). Evidently, simple income dispersion has increased in the second 
half of the 20th century. Again, this supports the impression from Figure 1, and is 
included here as a ‘point’ of reference. The top Gini curve, which takes population 
size into consideration, uses the 145 countries / regions discussed earlier. The bottom 
Gini curve divides the world into 35 larger countries / regions, as discussed in section 
4. Three remarks are worth mentioning. First, as is to be expected, identifying fewer 
and larger countries (35 instead of 145) provides less detail and leads to a lower index 
of income inequality. Second, despite the difference in detail, the two curves are very 
similar with respect to the evolution of income inequality over time. Third, we note in 
both cases that income inequality declines in the 1950s, rises in the 1960s (to reach a 
peak in 1968 or 1973, depending on the number of identified countries), is relatively 
stable in the 1970s, and starts to decline since about 1979.8 Not coincidentally, this is 
                                                 
8 The Lorenz curves in Figure 4 therefore depict the most equal (2003) and the most unequal (1973) 
global income distribution in the period 1950-2003. 
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the year the economic reform process in China (initiated in December 1978) starts to 
take effect. The decline in global income inequality seems to speed up around 1991, 
arguably the year at which the economic reform process in India starts to have an 
impact. The economic development in these two populous nations therefore surely has 
an impact on global inequality. We summarize our findings as follows: 
 
Observation 4A (global income inequality peaked in the 1970s) 
Global income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient reached a peak in the 
1970s and has declined since about 1980. The Gini coefficient analysis indicates 
income convergence and corroborates Friedman’s contention.  
 
Until now we used two concepts of income inequality. First, income per capita in each 
country, which assumes that each country can be described by a single representative 
individual. Second, the population weighted average income per capita in each 
country, this assumes that all individuals in each country receive the same income (we 
used this to show that size matters). But we neglected a third measure, that is 
individual income differences. The assumption that all individuals within a country 
receive the same income is clearly not true. So looking at income inquality should 
also measure within country income inequality. We return to this issue in the next 
section.  
  
The long term analysis so far suggests that over the past 60 years the “forces of 
globalization” have first given rise to an increase (not a decline) in income dispersion,  
and only relatively recently (since about 1980) a reduction in global income inequality 
(with a large role for India and China).9 This is, in fact, not surprising since standard 
trade theory tells us that global competition equalizes wages of identical workers who 
perform similar tasks under certain conditions.10 But this is hardly ever the case. Most 
                                                 
9 The weak link between globalization and income convergence is also supported by findings for the 
1870-1940 period, see Milanovic (2006). 
10 In fact, we refer here to Factor Price Equalization theorem in trade theory. The conditions for which 
this theorem holds are specific, as any textbook on trade theory will tell, but for a homogeneous 
product and workers doing similar tasks, and with the necessary model qualifications, the claim in the 
text is correct in a neo-classical world. More fundamentally, models based on New Economic 
Geography  (NEG) tell a different story: more integration can lead to a centre-periphery outcome in 
which factor prices are very different between countries (Krugman, 1991). However, different variants 
of the NEG, that is, the ones without inter-regional factor mobility and intermediate production, again 
predict that more integration leads to factor price convergence. More empirical research is needed to 
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income differences are based on the fact that workers in rich countries have more and 
better technology available to do their jobs. This raises productivity and thus wages. 
Only a limited share of the workforce is in direct competition with the unskilled 
workers in China or India. There is also some consensus among trade economists that 
the difficult labour market position of low-skilled workers in developed countries is 
caused by domestic technological developments instead of global competition (see 
Feenstra, 2004, for a review). 
 
4 Regional and within-country income inequality 
The above country-level analysis, may obscure important economic developments at 
lower levels of aggregation. Although Thomas Friedman does not discuss the issue of 
the level of aggregation explicitly, it does relate to his main point: reductions in 
transportation costs increase competition and reduce cost differences. In principle 
there is no reason why this should only hold at the inter-country level. This is why we 
will make a small detour in this section, and take a look at a different level of 
aggregation. To illustrate this, we discuss some regional income data. Most regional 
convergence analysis analyzes regions within a specific country or within a coherent 
group of countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004), for example, analyze 
convergence across US States, convergence across Japanese prefectures, and 
convergence across European regions. In contrast to the country-level results 
presented in section 2, these studies usually do find evidence of convergence at the 
regional level. There are, however, two important caveats.  
 
First, restricting the analysis to regions within a country or a coherent group of 
countries is not representative of global regional income trends. This is similar to the 
biased sample problem at the country-level.11 When Baumol (1986) analyzed 
convergence from 1870 to 1979 by investigating 16 industrialized countries he found 
strong evidence for income convergence. As pointed out by DeLong (1988), however, 
Baumol’s country sample is biased as he focuses on 16 countries with high income 
levels in 1979. The evidence for country-level income convergence tends to disappear 
when an unbiased country sample is taken.  
                                                                                                                                            
find out which particular variant describes the world best (see the various contributions in the special 
issue of Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol.36, No.5, “New Economic Geography: Closing 
the gap between Theory and Empirics”). 
11 See Romer (2001) for a discussion. 
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Second, the degree of regional income convergence, as measured by the estimated 
speed of convergence, tends to decrease over time. This observation holds for the 
States of the US, the Prefectures in Japan, and the regions in the EU. It is illustrated in 
Figure 6 for regional income convergence in the EU using the Martin (2001) data. As 
explained below, realizing this tendency of a recent absence of regional income 
convergence in the EU is crucial for understanding recent developments in the EU 
regional income distribution. 
 
Figure 6 Regional convergence in the EU, speed of convergence estimates 
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0
0.01
0.02
0.03
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
midyear of estimate period
es
tim
at
ed
 s
pe
ed
 o
f c
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 
BS1991
BS1995
A1995a
A1995b
EC1997
BP1999
fit
 
Authors’s calculations based on Martin (2001, Table 1). BS1991 = Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), 
BS1995 = Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); A1995a = Armstron (1995a); A1995b = Armstrong 
(1995b); EC1997 = European Commission (1997); BP1999 = Button and Pentecost (1999). The 
analysis is at the NUTS1 level for BS1991, BS1995, and A1995b; at the NUTS2 level otherwise.  
 
The EU identifies “regions” at three different levels, referred to as ‘NUTS’ regions.12 
The 27 EU countries consist of 95 NUTS1 regions, 268 NUTS2 regions, or 1284 
NUTS3 regions. Focusing on the NUTS2 level (which is probably most readily 
comparable between countries), we collected income and population data for 257 
regions, to construct Lorenz curves and calculate Gini coefficients in the period 1995-
                                                 
12 NUTS = Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques, that is: Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics. 
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2004.13 Figure 7 provides the Lorenz curves for 1995 and 2004, the most unequal and 
the most equal regional EU income distribution in this period, respectively. It is clear 
that regional EU income is much more equally distributed than global income 
(compare Figure 4). The figure suggests that this distribution is becoming a bit more 
equal. Indeed, the average Gini coefficient for the EU regions in this period is 0.2075, 
varying from a high of 0.2145 in 1995 to a low of 0.1979 in 2004 (see Figure 8). This 
slight trend, however, still obscures within-country effects. Looking at regions instead 
of countries still assumes that within a region income per capita is the same, which is 
not the case. 
  
Figure 7 Regional income inequality in the EU: Lorenz curves 
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Authors’s calculations based on http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu data; 257 NUTS2 EU regions for 25 
EU countries (excludes Romania, Malta, and 2 regions in Spain); GDP in PPS (corrected for 
purchasing power parity). 
 
Measurements of within country or region income inequality is not trivial, as not all 
countries have household surveys to provide the necessary data, and if so do not use 
the same definitions of income (see Milanovic, 2006a,b). In general, the following 
picture emerges. There is consensus in the literature that the across-country inequality 
                                                 
13 We excluded the regions in Romania and Malta, and two spanish regions for lack of data availability.  
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recently decreases (see observation 4A), and also that the across-country differences 
account for 70 percent of global inequality and the within country inequality for about 
30 percent (Sala-i-Martin, 2006). There is no clear consensus, however, on 
developments with respect to within-country inequality, which seems to be more 
volatile than the across-country developments. Still, we give an indication of the 
within country/region income inequality using the Theil-index. An advantage of the 
(non-negative) Theil index (where 0 indicates complete income equality) is that it can 
be decomposed into different components, and the within country/region income 
inequality can be calculated without detailed census information.14 Sala-i-Martin 
(2006), for example, uses this to decompose global income inequality to a within-
country and across-country inequality (p. 388):  
“The “within-country” component is the amount of inequality that would exist in the 
world if all countries had the same income per capita ... The “across-country” 
component is the amount of inequality that would exist in the world if all citizens 
within each country had the same level of income, but there were differences in per 
capita incomes across countries.” 
Noting that global income inequality as measured by the Theil index has fallen in the 
period 1970-2000, he then uses the decomposition to show that the within-country 
component has become more important over time (see Table A.4). An obvious, 
important example in this respect is the increased income inequality in China.  
 
                                                 
14 Such a decomposition is not possible with the Gini-coefficient (see, for example, Milanovitz, 2006a, 
b)  
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Figure 8 Regional income inequality in the EU: Theil index and Gini coefficient 
EU regional income inequality: Theil index and Gini coefficient
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Authors’s calculations based on http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu data; 257 NUTS2 EU regions for 25 
EU countries (excludes Romania, Malta, and 2 regions in Spain); GDP in PPS (corrected for 
purchasing power parity). 
 
A similar decomposition for EU regional income inequality as measured using the 
Theil index, which (like the Gini coefficient) has fallen in the period 1995-2004, 
reveals, similarly, that the regional income inequality between EU countries has 
fallen, whereas regional income inequality within EU countries has increased, see 
Figure 8. As such it continues a trend noted in Duro (2001) using data for 1982-1995. 
As also pointed out by Puga (2002), and discussed by him in a Geographical 
Economics / New Economic Geography framework, regional inequality (in terms of 
income and unemployment) within EU countries has recently increased, not 
decreased. In this context, Puga highlights the importance of increased inequality in 
terms of economic accessibility among EU regions (absolute gains for most regions, 
but relatively larger gains for the core regions). This finding weakens the conclusion 
of observation 4, as noted below: 
 
Observation 4B (increased within-country inequality since the 1980s): 
Decomposing global income inequality or EU regional income inequality to a within-
country and across-country component using the Theil index shows that within-
country inequality has increased since about the 1980s. This is contrary to Friedman’s 
assertions on income convergence to the extent that this should hold within countries. 
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5 Leapfrogging; leaders and laggards for the last 2000 years 
“That is why I introduced the idea that the world has gone from round to flat. 
Everywhere you turn, hierarchies are being challenged from below…” 
(Friedman 2005, p, 45) 
 
The discussion above has focused on the extent of income dispersion and income 
inequality. The impression we give is that to some extent current developments in the 
world economy are “business as usual”, with the exceptions of India and China. We 
have not paid any attention, however, to the question whether leading positions of 
some countries in the world economy might be challenged in the future, or that these 
positions are stable over time. Friedman might object to our historical analyses in the 
previous sections that he is looking forward in time instead of backward. We argue 
that looking further back in history is necessary; hierarchies are indeed challenged 
from below, and this happens all the time, but this only becomes clear in a historical 
perspective. If one only considers the last 25 years or so, there is no leap-frogging 
taking place. 
 
Currently the question is: could China be the future leader in the world economy? 
This brings us to an important psychological, economic, and historical empirical 
phenomenon: leapfrogging. To identify who is “leading” or “lagging”, we continue to 
focus on the personal level by looking at income per capita levels, but now for a very 
long time period. The extent of a country’s lead or lag is expressed as a country’s 
income per capita as a percentage of the world average income per capita in the year 
under consideration. As an added bonus, this will provide us with additional 
information on the degree of income convergence or divergence, as discussed below.  
 
We can identify 28 individual (current) countries from all continents for which fairly 
reliable population and income data for the last 2000 years has recently been provided 
by Maddison (2007), namely two countries in Africa, two in the Americas, six in 
Asia, fifteen in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Together, these 28 countries 
(with about 3.7 billion inhabitants in 2007) represent about 82 per cent of the world 
population in the year 1, gradually declining to about 56 per cent of the world total in 
2003. Although detailed information for the remaining 197 countries in the world is 
not available for the entire period, it is possible to construct 7 different regions – 
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groups of countries for which fairly reliable aggregate population and income data are 
available for the last 2000 years, see Table 2 for an overview and Table A.1 in the 
appendix for the list of (current) countries belonging to a particular region. Taken 
together, this provides us with 35 observations (28 countries plus 7 regions) on the 
distribution of population and income across the world in the last two millennia.  
 
Table 2 Individual countries and regions 
28 individual countries 
Australia  Greece  Norway  
Austria  India  Portugal  
Belgium  Iran Spain  
Canada Iraq  Sweden  
China  Italy  Switzerland  
Denmark  Japan  Turkey  
Egypt  Mexico  United Kingdom  
Finland  Morocco  United States  
France Netherlands   
Germany  New Zealand   
7 regions – groups of countries (# of countries); see Table A.1 for details 
Eastern Europe (12) Other East Asia (42) Other West Asia (12) 
Former USSR (15) Other Latin America (46) Other West Europe (15) 
Other Africa (55)   
 
Figure 9 depicts the respective leaders and laggards over time in terms of income per 
capita, see Table A.3 in the appendix for details. In the year 1 Italy (Rome) was the 
leader, with an income level about 73 percent higher than the world average. The 
leading position was taken over by Iran and Iraq (44 percent above the average) in the 
year 1000, before it was regained by Italy (Venice, Florence) in 1500 (94 percent 
above the average). The Dutch trading power gained prominence from 1600 to about 
1820, with a relative income peak in 1700 (246 percent above average). Since then, 
the lead has switched frequently, going first to the UK, then to Australia, followed by 
the USA, Switzerland, and again the USA. The highest relative peak (374 percent 
above average) is reached in 1999. It is not only clear that the leadership changes 
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from one country to another over time, but also that (despite prolonged periods of 
decline) the relative income position of the leader tends to increase over time. 
 
Figure 9 Leaders and laggards in the world economy, 1-2003 
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); oAfrica = other Africa; W Offshoots = Canada, 
USA, Australia, and New Zealand; See Table A.3 regarding the laggards in the years 1 and 1000. 
 
Many countries qualified for the top “lagging” position in the year 1, including all of 
the Americas, Australia, Japan, and what is now the former USSR; their income level 
lagged about 14 percent behind the world average. Most of these countries (with the 
exception of Japan) are still lagging behind in the year 1000 (11 percent below the 
average). In 1500 and 1600 only what Maddison labels the “Western Offshoots” 
(Canada, USA, Australia, and New Zealand) still qualify for the top lagging positions 
(about 30 percent below average), from which the USA and Canada escape after 
1600, Australia after 1700, and New Zealand only after 1820. Note the remarkable 
increase in prosperity for these countries as both Australia and the USA become the 
world leader relatively shortly afterwards. Africa (excluding Egypt and Morocco) 
becomes the laggard in 1870 (45 percent below average), a position to which it 
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returned in 1990 (up to 80 percent below average in 2003).15 For most of the rest of 
the 20th century India and China (the currently feared top globalization countries from 
an OECD perspective) took turns in being the world’s laggard. It is again clear that 
there is leapfrogging (the top laggard position changes regularly) and that the relative 
income position of the laggard tends to decrease over time.  
 
Table 3 Growth experience of China and USA and implied convergence time 
GDP per capita real Sub-period Whole period 
annual growth rate % 1950-63 1963-76 1976-89 1989-2003 1950-2003 
USA  1.90 2.51 2.36 1.65 2.10 
China  2.28 2.83 5.92 6.56 4.44 
Implied convergence time (in years) and year of income inequality (if USA growth = 2.1%) 
Convergence time 1023 257 50 43 81 
Year of equal income 3026 2260 2053 2046 2084 
 
Given the fact that many observers expect that China will be the next world economic 
leader it is interesting to take a closer look at China’s prospects of becoming a world 
economic leader. Table 3 shows the real per capita economic growth experience for 
China and the USA in the period 1950-2003 and for the four sub-periods. The 
american growth rate is relatively stable over time, with an average per capita increase 
of 2.10 percent per year. China’s performance is rather different. For the first two sub-
periods (26 years) its growth rate was very close to that of the USA. For the last two 
sub-periods its growth rate 3.5 to almost 5 percent per year higher than the USA.  
 
In 2003 income per capita (corrected for PPP) in the USA was GK$ 29,037 and in 
China GK$ 4,609. The time required for China to leapfrog the USA depends, of 
course, on your guesstimate of future economic growth rates for China and the USA. 
In view of its steady development over time, let’s assume that the american per capita 
growth rate continues to be 2.10 percent in real terms per year (the 1950-2003 
average). Using the average growth experience for China in 1950-2003 as an 
indication (4.44 percent per capita per year), it is straightforward to calculate that it 
                                                 
15 The graph ignores developments in Iraq since 1991, which reached the all time low laggard position 
(84.2 percent below average) in 2003. 
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will take a substantial 81 years for per capita income in China to become equal to per 
capita income in the USA, which would occur in the year 2084. An alarmist may, of 
course, point at the bigger difference in growth rates in recent years and argue that 
leapfrogging may only take 50 or 43 years and occur at about the year 2050 (see the 
last two rows of Table 3). Many economists will argue that it is highly unlikely that 
China will maintain the recent big difference in growth rates. Taking earlier sub-
period experiences liste in Table 3 into consideration, it may easily take more than 
250 or even a thousand years before leapfrogging occurs, if ever. The point is, as 
illustrated in Figure 10, that small reductions in China’s current fast growth rate will 
dramatically increase the time required for leapfrogging to occur. In view of this and 
in light of the experience of the last century, immanent leapfrogging of the USA by 
China is not very likely. This brings us to observation 5. 
 
Figure 10 The speed of leapfrogging: convergence between China and USA 
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Observation 5 (Relative leapfrogging and income divergence) 
Investigating income per capita relative to the world average, we observe that there is 
frequent leapfrogging (different countries are in the lead or lag behind). Moreover, 
there is income divergence: the leader’s relative position improves and the laggard’s 
relative position deteriorates over time. Hierarchies are indeed challenged over time. 
However, at present no spectacular leapfrogs can be expected in the near future. 
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Figure 11 Country size, initial income level, and economic growth 
a: 1-2003; b: 1700-2003; c: 1870-2003; and d: 1950-2003 
a Country size, initial income, and economic growth; 1-2003
Bubble size proportional to population in year 1
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
initial income level
ec
on
om
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
India
China ItalyTurkey
France
USA
'OECD'
 
b Country size, initial income, and economic growth; 1700-2003
Bubble size proportional to population in year 1700
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Figure 11 continued 
c Country size, initial income, and economic growth; 1870-2003
Bubble size proportional to population in year 1870
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d Country size, initial income, and economic growth; 1950-2003
Bubble size proportional to population in year 1950
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Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); the encircled countries labelled ‘OECD’ exclude 
Turkey in all panels and Mexico in panels a-c; o = other; f = former; Lat Am = Latin America. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the discussion above by using bubble diagrams for selected 
years.16 Panels a and b show the overwhelming initial influence of India and China in 
                                                 
16 Note that, unlike Figure 3, the scales are different for the various panels.  
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terms of total population. Together these two countries account for 60 and 50 percent 
of the world population in the years 1 and 1700, respectively.17 Panels a and b also 
show the rather exceptional leads (an income level far above all other countries) of 
Italy in the year 1 and of the Netherlands in the year 1700. This contrasts with panels 
c and d (the years 1870 and 1950), where a range of other countries are close in 
income level to the leader’s position. All panels allow us to identify most of the 
OECD countries quite easily and track the developments and relative importance of 
individual countries or regions. Italy, for example, has remained a relatively 
prosperous nation most of the time. Japan already moved up in the ranks quickly from 
1870 to 1950, before the Japanese miracle started. Most impressive is the 
development for the USA, which is a lagging tiny population speck in panels a and b, 
to move swiflty up the ranks, take over the lead, and rapidly increase in population 
size in the 19th and 20th century.18 The lagging position of Africa (excl. Egypt and 
Morocco) in these two centuries is evident from panels c and d, where Africa sits 
firmly at the bottom of the figures, indicating a low growth rate. 
 
Table 4 Convergence; regressions for the last two millennia 
Dependent variable: annualized per capita economic growth rate 
Explanatory var 1-2003 1000-2003 1500-2003 1600-2003 1700-2003 
Constant 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.007 0.005 
(t-stat) (2.601) (4.741) (0.490) (0.958) (0.566) 
Initial income# -0.001* -0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(t-stat) (-2.110) (-4.215) (0.268) (0.021) (0.561) 
R2 0.119 0.350 0.002 0.000 0.009 
Explanatory var 1820-2003 1870-2003 1913-2003 1950-2003  
Constant -0.008 0.003 0.009 0.035  
(t-stat) (-0.719) (0.302) (0.871) (2.065)  
Initial income# 0.003* 0.002 0.001 -0.001  
(t-stat) (2.040) (1.620) (0.948) (-0.632)  
R2 0.112 0.074 0.072 0.012  
Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); 35 countries / regions.  
# ln(initial income per capita); * income effect significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                                                 
17 It has now declined to ‘only’ 37 percent in 2003. 
18 On a per capita basis the developments in Australia in the 19th century are even more impressive, but 
its population remains small, never to exceed 0.3 percent of the world total. 
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Table 4 provides summary statistics on level regressions corresponding to Figure 11. 
If we go back long enough in time, namely thousand or two thousand years, there is 
some support for convergence (the impact of the initial income level is negative and 
statistically significant). For the most recent 500 years, however, we find no support 
for level convergence, whereas there is some support for level-divergence in the 
period 1820-2003. Observation 6 summarizes these findings. 
 
Observation 6 (convergence after 1000 years, but not since 1500) 
There is support for convergence after 1000 or 2000 years, but no support for 
convergence since 1500. 
 
6 The death of distance? 
“The net result of this convergence was the creation of a global, Web-enabled playing 
field that allows for multiple forms of collaboration – the sharing of knowledge and 
work – in real time, without regard to geography, distance, or in the near future even 
language...”      (Friedman 2005,  pp. 176-177) 
 
A central theme in Friedman’s book is that the world becomes smaller. The citation 
above indicates that he has ‘distance’ in mind. On many occasions in the book it is 
argued that distance, as a broad measure of trade barriers, becomes smaller, such that:  
“it shrank the world from a size large to a size medium…around the year 2000 we 
entered a whole new era…shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny…” 
(Friedman, 2005, p9-10). 
 
For trade economists this is a puzzling observation because there is a well-known 
empirical regularity, the so-called gravity equation, which shows that distance is an 
important determinant of international trade flows. The export of goods and services 
from one country to another involves time, effort and hence costs. Goods have to be 
physically loaded and unloaded, transported by truck, train, ship, or plane, packed, 
insured, traced, etc. before they reach their destination. There they have to be 
unpacked, checked, assembled, and displayed before they can be sold to the consumer 
or an intermediate firm. A distribution and maintenance network has to be established, 
and the exporter will have to familiarize herself with the (legal) rules and procedures 
in another country, usually in another language and embedded in a different culture. 
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All of this involves costs, which tend to increase with “distance”. As indicated above 
this can be both physical distance, which may be hampered or alleviated by 
geographical phenomena such as mountain ranges or easy access to good waterways, 
or political, cultural, or social distance, which also require time and effort before one 
can successfully engage in international business (see on the role of ‘time’ Harrigan 
and Venables, 2006).   
 
Figure 12 Estimates of the distance effect over time (kernel fit) 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1880 1920 1960 2000
year
es
tim
at
ed
 d
is
ta
nc
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
Data source: Disdier and Head (2006). Our kernel fit is based on Epanechnikov (h = 19.575). 
 
The gravity-equation impact of distance on the size of trade flows can be summarized 
as follows. If A and B are two countries with income levels GDPA and GDPB, the 
hypothesized size of their bilateral trade flow is given by: 
(1) θ
βα
BtoA
BA
BtoA
distance
GDPGDPtrade ⋅= , 
where the “distanceA to B” variable can be measured in various ways (for example in 
kilometers between the main economic centers of the countries) and the parameters 
α , β , and θ  are to be estimated using actual data. Equation (1) indicates that the 
larger the two trading partners, measured by their income levels, and the smaller the 
distance between them, the larger the bilateral trade flow. The empirical evidence in 
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favour of the gravity equation is overwhelming. As a result, the gravity equation has 
been used in numerous empirical trade studies.  
 
In view of the frequent use of the gravity equation, Disdier and Head (2006) were able 
to perform a so-called meta-analysis of gravity model estimates, which leads to a 
striking conclusion. Disdier and Head analyze 1,467 estimated distance effects (that 
is, estimates of the parameter θ  in equation (1) on the impact of distance on 
international trade flows) gathered from a wide range of different studies. Their 
findings can be effectively summarized with the help of Figure 12.19 The higher the 
estimated parameter θ , the stronger the negative effect of distance on the size of trade 
flows, and therefore the more important distance and location is for determining these 
trade flows. The mean effect of distance on trade for the period as a whole is around 
0.9 (with 90 percent of all estimates between 0.28 and 1.55). This implies that a 10 
percent increase in distance leads to a 9 percent reduction of international trade flows. 
The estimates in Figure 12 suggest that the distance effect became less important 
between 1890 and 1940. Most striking, however, is the increased (not decreased) 
estimated distance effect in the second half of the 20th century (also with some 
increased variance). In sharp contrast to the opinion of the death-of-distance group, 
distance is therefore becoming more (not less) important for determining international 
trade flows. See Disdier and Head (2006) for a further discussion. 
 
The next question is how the findings of Disdier and Head manifest themselves in 
world trade flows. This is illustrated for Europe in Table 5 by providing regional 
imports and exports for Europe as a percentage of total imports and exports for 
selected years. The table shows that, despite two world wars, the isolationist period 
between the wars, and the enormous increase in the volume of world trade from 1950 
onwards, the regional distribution of European trade is quite stable, with a dominant 
(and, if anything, increasing) local component. Europe itself was and still is the most 
important source and destination of its trade flows. In this sense, world trade is not 
global but “provincial”, since the main trading partners are still to be found among the 
closest neighbours (various barriers to trade may contribute to this finding; see, 
however, also section 6). Our findings are summarized in observation 7. 
                                                 
19 We are grateful to Anne-Célia Disdier and Keith Head for providing us with the data for this figure. 
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Table 5 Distribution of European trade flows, sel. years (% of total export / import) 
a. Export Europe USA S-America Asia Africa ROW 
1860 67.5 9.1 7.7 10 3.2 2.5 
1910 67.9 7.6 4.2 9.8 4.8 2.4 
2005 75.7 6.9 1.3 7.6 2.6 5.9 
b. Import       
1860 61.0 14.3 7.8 12.1 3.2 1.7 
1910 60.0 14.0 8.2 10.0 4.5 3.4 
2005 76.8 3.3 1.5 11.3 2.9 4.1 
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999) for the years 1860 and 1910; authors’s calculations based on 
WTO International Trade Statistics 2006 for the year 2005. 
 
Observation 7 (trade is distance-determined) 
International trade flows are to a large extent determined by distance; a 10 percent 
increase in distance reduces trade by about 9 percent. Moreover, the importance of 
distance seems to increase, not decrease, in the second half of the 20th century, which 
is in strong contrast with the contention of Friedman in this respect. 
 
Box 1 The growing importance of services20 
Our discussion in the main text focuses on trade in goods, not services. As illustrated 
in Figure 13, the services sectors tend to become increasingly important as economies 
become wealthier and more sophisticated. At the global level in 2003, for example, 
average employment in the services sectors was 57.6 per cent of total employment, 
ranging from a minimum of 12.9 per cent for China (with a per capita GDP of $1,067) 
to a maximum of 80.3 per cent for Hong Kong (with a per capita GDP of $25,633). 
Typical examples in this respect are also provided by Bangladesh, with a GDP per 
capita of $395 and 23.5 per cent of employment in the services sector, and the United 
States, with a GDP per capita of $35,566 and 75.2 per cent employment in the 
services sector.21 A popular method for distinguishing between goods and services is 
to argue that services, such as getting a haircut, are produced and consumed 
                                                 
20 Based on van Marrewijk (2007); data in this box are from the World Development Indicators, which 
explains the deviations with the main text, see Figure 13. 
21 The share of industrial employment tends to first increase and then decrease with income. 
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simultaneously, although not necessarily at the same place. A less sophisticated, but 
effective, method is to argue that if you can drop it on your foot it must be a good.  
 
 Figure 13 GDP per capita and services employment; 82 countries, 2003* 
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Data source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005. Data are the most recently available 
in  the period 2001–2003. 
 
If the share of services employment increases it must be at the expense of the share of 
some other type of employment. In general, agricultural sectors tend to become less 
important as economies become wealthier. In 2003, for example, average employment 
in the agricultural sectors was 17.1 per cent of total employment, ranging from a 
minimum of 0.1 per cent for Macao (with a per capita GDP of $15,892) to a 
maximum of 62.1 per cent for Bangladesh. Agricultural employment in the United 
States, for example, was 2.4 per cent of total employment.  
 
Table 6 World exports of merchandise and commercial services 
Value (bn US $) Annual percentage change 
 2005 2000-05 2003 2004 2005 
Merchandise 10,120 10 17 21 13 
Commercial services 2,415 10 15 19 11 
Source: WTO, World Trade Report 2006 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) identifies four modes of international supply 
of services: 
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 Cross-border; services supplied from the territory of one country into the territory 
of another country (e.g. tele-medical advice or distance training). 
 Consumption abroad; services supplied in the territory of a nation to the 
consumers of another nation (e.g. tourists or foreign students). 
 Commercial presence; services supplied by one country through commercial 
presence in the territory of another country (e.g. affiliates of banks or hotels). 
 Presence of natural persons; services supplied by a country through the presence 
of natural persons in another country (e.g. consultant or health worker). 
Technological developments (such as improvements in telecommunciation) have 
made previously non-tradable services now tradable in principle. Although it is 
frequently argued (Friedman is a prime example) that this will lead to a rapid increase 
in services trade (which is true) and have drastic consequences for the structure of the 
world economy (which might be true), it is important to realize that goods trade is still 
about four times more important than services trade and is increasing at a speed which 
is at least as fast at the rise in services trade, see Table 6. In any case, the main 
exporters of services are also the main exporters of goods and their regional 
distribution is quite similar.  
 
7 International production networks 
Looking only at trade flows might not convince the advocates of the death-of-distance 
group arguing in favour of a global economy that becomes “flatter”. Most 
international trade is in the hands of multinational corporations, which might benefit 
the most from a flatter global economy. Arguably, the increased importance of 
multinational activity is one of the most distinctive features of the present wave of 
globalization. This allows multinational firms to “slice-up-the-value-chain” in order to 
increase profitability; this term indicates that different parts of the production process 
are increasingly placed in different locations to benefit from economies of scale, skill 
differences, and low wages in order to increase overall multinational profitability. The 
ICT revolution makes the re-location of firms or parts of firms increasingly possible. 
Looking only at trade flows might obscure trends in the global re-location of firms. 
This relatively new aspect of world trade might in fact be the inspiration of 
Friedman’s citation that presented at the beginning of this paper, namely that we have 
“to run faster in order to stay in the same place”.  
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Table 7 Distribution of FDI; by region and selected countries, 1980-2005 
 Inflow 
Region 1978-1980 1988-1990 1998-2000 2003-2005 
Developed economies 79.7 82.5 77.3 59.4 
 European Union 39.1 40.3 46 40.7 
 Japan 0.4 0.04 0.8 0.8 
 United States 23.8 31.5 24 12.6 
Developing economies 20.3 17.5 21.7 35.9 
 Africa 2 1.9 1 3 
 Latin America & Caribbean 13 5 9.7 11.5 
 Asia and Oceania 5.3 10.5 11 21.4 
  West Asia -1.6 0.3 0.3 3 
  South, East & S-E Asia 6.7 10 10.7 18.4 
 South-East Europe & CIS 0.02 0.02 0.9 4.7 
World 100 100 100 100 
 Outflow 
Region 1978-1980 1988-1990 1998-2000 2003-2005 
Developed economies 97 93.1 90.4 85.8 
 European Union 44.8 50.6 64.4 54.6 
 Japan 4.9 19.7 2.6 4.9 
 United States 39.7 13.6 15.9 15.7 
Developing economies 3 6.9 9.4 12.3 
 Africa 1 0.4 0.2 0.2 
 Latin America & Caribbean 1.1 1 4.1 3.5 
 Asia and Oceania 0.9 5.6 5.1 8.6 
  West Asia 0.3 0.5 0.1 1 
  South, East & S-E Asia 0.6 5.1 5 7.7 
 South-East Europe & CIS .. 0.01 0.2 1.8 
World 100 100 100 100 
Source: World Investment Report 2006, UNCTAD 
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The numerous anecdotes in Friedman’s book suggests that he, indeed, often has the 
activities of the multinational corporation in mind. Discussions on FDI first have to 
answer the question what type of FDI is being discussed. The standard distinction that 
is made in the literature is between so-called vertical FDI, and horizontal FDI. The 
motive for the former type are cost differences (low wages), whereas the dominant 
motive for the latter type is market-seeking (high wages). The distinction is important 
because, for example, low wage countries are attractive for vertical FDI, but not for 
horizontal FDI. In both cases it is very difficult to derive clear predictions what the 
effects are on relative wages in the host versus home countries as one has to calculate 
relative factor intensities of the re-located firms relative to local factor intensities; a 
priori convergence is as likely as divergence (see Barba-Navaretti and Venables, ch.3, 
4). Also the relation between the two types of FDI and transport cost is different: 
horizontal FDI is stimulated by high transport cost (jumping over the trade barrier), 
whereas vertical FDI is stimulated by low transport costs (re-importing becomes less 
expensive). 
 
What about the facts on the relocation of activity through Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)?22 Recently, many surveys on the behavior of the multinational enterprise have 
become available (see e.g. Markusen, 2002, or Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004). 
The findings of the literature can be illustrated with the help of Table 7. Most striking 
in the table is that both inflows and outflows of FDI are directed towards, and come 
from, high wage developed countries. This suggests that most FDI is market seeking, 
that is, is attracted towards large, high-income, and skilled-labor abundant countries, 
with a declining relative inflow only very recently. In view of the volatility of FDI, 
we conclude that the often expressed fears with respect to factor cost seeking FDI are 
for the moment unwarranted.  
 
What is the relation between this type of investment and distance? Unfortunately, this 
effect is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher trade costs, the higher this 
type of investment, because exporting becomes a more expensive alternative. On the 
other hand, distance also increases transaction costs; the further one is from home, the 
more cultures differ. So with respect to market seeking investment this has to be 
                                                 
22 Note, that FDI flows do not cover all possible ways to slice-up-the-value chain; one does not need to 
own (share of) a foreign plant.  
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resolved empirically. Markusen (2002) shows that the net effect tends to be negative. 
This suggests that international investment flows behave very much like international 
trade flows: one likes to stay close to home. What are the effects on the labour 
markets? Individual country evidence show a somewhat mixed picture, as is discussed 
in Baldwin (2006). For the OECD as a whole the effects of offshoring seem limited 
(Van Welsum and Reif, 2005).  
 
Observation 8 (FDI is mostly market-seeking) 
The largest part of FDI flows originates from high-income countries and has as a 
destination another high-income countries (i.e. is market-seeking FDI). Taking into 
consideration the volatility of FDI flows. In the most recent period there is indication 
that the share going to developing countries is (last five years) increasing. This is in 
accordance with Friedman’s claim that most of the dynamics with respect to slicing-
up-the-value-chain is of recent date. 
 
8 Conclusions 
We review empirical evidence regarding per capita income levels and international 
trade and investment flows in relation to several claims made in Thomas Friedman’s 
book “the world is flat”. Using different data and methods, our findings are 
summarized in eight observations. We note, for example, that most countries exhibit 
economic growth, and therefore do not stay in the same place as far as income per 
capita is concerned. We find no support for global convergence at the country level 
since 1950. We also note that the formidable population size of China and India 
ensures that developments in these countries have a global impact. It is for this reason, 
combined with the rapid economic developments in these two countries since 1980, 
that global income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) reached a peak in 
the 1970s and has declined since about 1980.  
 
Investigating income per capita relative to the world average, we observe that there is 
frequent leapfrogging (different countries are in the lead or lag behind). Moreover, 
over a longer time span of 2000 years, there is clearly income divergence: the leader’s 
relative position improves and the laggard’s relative position deteriorates over time. 
Hierarchies are therefore indeed challenged over time. Going back further in time also 
shows that there is some support for convergence after 1000 or 2000 years, but no 
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support for convergence since 1500. When focusing on international trade flows 
rather than income levels we see that trade is to a large extent determined by distance; 
a 10 percent increase in distance reduces trade by about 9 percent. Moreover, the 
importance of distance seems to increase, not decrease, in the second half of the 20th 
century. Distance is also important for cross-border investment (FDI) flows, which 
mostly originate in high-income countries with a destination in another high-income 
country (market-seeking FDI). Taking into consideration the volatility of FDI flows, 
there is some indication that the share going to developing countries is recently (last 
five years) increasing.  
 
Table 8  Friedman’s Claims confronted with the evidence 
Friedman’s claims Obs. Support? Facts 
“Run faster to stay in 
the same place” 
1 no Most countries do not stay in the same place, but 
grow STRESS INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Competition creates 
“a more level 
playing field” 
2, 3, 
4A 
4B, 
6 
mixed Income data show divergence, instead of 
convergence, correcting for country size shows 
recent – as of 1980 - income convergence. 
Increasing income inequality within countries has 
domestic causes (technological developments).  
“ hierarchies are 
being challenged 
from below” 
5 no Hierarchies indeed change over time, there is, 
however, no sign that this is presently the case or 
will be the case in the near future (China is too far 
behind). 
“Death of Distance” 7 no Distance is not dead, nor is it decreasing. If 
anything, there is a tendency of distance to 
become more important. 
“small companies 
could suddenly see 
around the world” 
8 mixed Most FDI takes place between rich countries, 
indicating that firms look for high wages of 
consumers rather than for low wages of workers. 
However, developing countries are increasingly a 
destination for FDI flows, which is a recent 
phenomenon. 
Obs. = Observation 
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Taking all eight observations together – as summarized in Table 8 – we find both 
support for Friedman’s the-world-is-flat claims (or those of other death-of-distance 
proponents), but also more substantial evidence of the opposite. Friedman’s most 
important contention that the world becomes smaller is not supported by the evidence; 
the influence of distance on world trade is not only strong but also increasing. In 
contrast to Friedman’s “shrinking world” arguments, this leads us to conclude that 
“it’s a big world after all.” 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Composition of regions – groups of countries 
Eastern Europe (12 countries) 
Albania  Czech Republic  Romania  
Bosnia  Hungary  Serbia/Montenegro  
Bulgaria  Macedonia  Slovakia  
Croatia  Poland  Slovenia  
Former USSR (15 countries) 
Armenia  Kazakhstan Russian Federation  
Azerbaijan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  
Belarus  Latvia  Turkmenistan  
Estonia  Lithuania  Ukraine  
Georgia  Moldova  Uzbekistan  
Other Africa (55 countries) 
Algeria  Ghana Rwanda 
Angola Guinea  Saint Helena 
Benin  Guinea Bissau  São Tomé and Principe  
Botswana Kenya Senegal  
Burkina Faso Lesotho Seychelles 
Burundi Liberia Sierra Leone 
Cameroon  Libya  Somalia  
Cape Verde  Madagascar South Africa  
Central African Republic  Malawi Sudan  
Chad  Mali Swaziland 
Comoro Islands  Mauritania  Tanzania  
Congo Mauritius  Togo 
Côte d'Ivoire Mayotte Tunisia  
Djibouti Mozambique Uganda  
Equatorial Guinea  Namibia  Western Sahara 
Eritrea Niger Zaire  
Ethiopia Nigeria Zambia  
Gabon Reunion  Zimbabwe 
Gambia    
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Table A.1 continued 
Other East Asia (42 countries) 
Afghanistan Laos Papua New Guinea 
American Samoa Macao Philippines 
Bangladesh Malaysia  Samoa 
Bhutan Maldives Singapore  
Brunei Marshall Islands Solomon Islands 
Burma  Micronesia South Korea  
Cambodia  Mongolia  Sri Lanka 
Cook Islands Nauru Taiwan 
Fiji Nepal  Thailand  
French Polynesia New Caledonia Tonga 
Guam North Korea  Tuvalu 
Hong Kong Northern Mariana Islands Vanuatu 
Indonesia  Pakistan Vietnam 
Kiribati Palau Wallis and Fortuna 
Other Latin America (46 countries) 
Anguilla Dominica Panama 
Antigua & Barbuda Dominican Republic  Paraguay 
Argentina  Ecuador  Peru  
Aruba El Salvador Puerto Rico  
Bahamas Grenada St. Kitts Nevis 
Barbados Guadeloupe St. Pierre and Miquelon 
Belize Guatemala St. Vincent 
Bermuda Guyana St.Lucia 
Bolivia  Guyana (Fr.) Suriname 
Brazil  Haïti Trinidad and Tobago  
British Virgin Islands Honduras Turks and Caicos Islands 
Cayman Islands Jamaica  Uruguay 
Chile  Martinique Venezuela 
Colombia  Montserrat Virgin Islands 
Costa Rica Neth. Antilles  
Cuba Nicaragua  
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Table A.1 continued 
Other West Europe (15 countries) 
Andorra Guernsey Liechtenstein 
Cyprus Iceland Luxembourg 
Faeroe Islands Ireland Malta 
Gibraltar Isle of Man Monaco 
Greenland Jersey San Marino 
Other West Asia (12 countries) 
Bahrain  Lebanon  Syria  
Israel  Oman United Arab Emirates 
Jordan  Qatar West Bank and Gaza  
Kuwait  Saudi Arabia  Yemen  
 
The individual countries listed in Table A.1 are also used for the convergence analysis 
in the period 1950-2003. The following countries, however, are grouped together: 
Table A.2 Grouping of countries for 1950-2003 convergence analysis 
Group: 13 small WEC countries 
Andorra Guernsey Luxembourg 
Cyprus Iceland Malta 
Faeroe Islands Isle of Man Monaco 
Gibraltar Jersey San Marino 
Greenland Liechtenstein  
Group: 24 small Caribbean countries  
Anguilla Cayman Islands Neth. Antilles 
Antigua & Barbuda Dominica St. Kitts Nevis 
Aruba Grenada St. Pierre and Miquelon 
Bahamas Guadeloupe St. Vincent 
Barbados Guyana St.Lucia 
Belize Guyana (Fr.) Suriname 
Bermuda Martinique Turks and Caicos Islands 
British Virgin Islands Montserrat Virgin Islands 
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Table A.2 continued 
Group: 23 Small East Asian countries  
Bhutan French Polynesia Palau 
Brunei Guam Samoa 
Cook Islands Kiribati Solomon Islands 
Macao Marshall Islands Tonga 
Maldives Micronesia Tuvalu 
Fiji Nauru Vanuatu 
Papua New Guinea New Caledonia Wallis and Fortuna 
American Samoa Northern Mariana Islands  
Group: Eritrea and Ethiopia 
Eritrea Ethiopia  
Group: 3 Small African countries 
Mayotte Saint Helena Western Sahara 
Group: Czechoslovakia  
Czech Republic  Slovakia   
Group: Former USSR; see Table A.1 
Group: Yugoslavia 
Bosnia  Macedonia  Serbia/Montenegro  
Croatia  Slovenia   
 
Table A.3a GDP per capita, regions (% of world average in respective year) 
Year 1 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 2003
East Europe  88 89 88 92 98 102 107 111 100 100
former USSR 86 89 88 93 99 103 108 97 135 83
o Africa 91 91 72 70 68 62 55 40 41 21
o East Asia 91 94 98 95 91 85 68 55 37 60
o Lat America 86 89 72 72 82 99 77 94 120 84
o West Asia 108 136 102 183 94 87 75 56 101 106
o West Europe 100 89 102 107 118 133 200 181 170 363
Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007); o = other, Lat = Latin 
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Table A.3b GDP per capita, countries (% of world average in respective year) 
Year 1 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 2003
Australia  86 89 71 67 65 78 375 338 351 360
Austria  91 94 125 140 161 183 213 227 176 328
Belgium  96 94 154 164 186 198 308 276 259 327
Canada 86 89 71 67 70 136 194 291 345 359
China  96 100 106 101 98 90 61 36 21 71
Denmark  86 89 130 147 169 191 229 256 329 357
Egypt  129 111 84 80 77 71 74 59 43 47
Finland  86 89 80 90 104 117 130 138 201 317
France 101 94 128 141 148 170 215 228 250 338
Germany  87 91 121 133 148 162 211 239 184 296
Greece  118 89 76 81 86 96 101 104 91 211
India  96 100 97 92 89 80 61 44 29 33
Iran 107 144 106 101 98 88 82 66 81 86
Iraq  107 144 97 92 89 88 82 66 65 16
Italy  173 100 194 185 179 168 172 168 166 296
Japan  86 94 88 87 93 100 84 91 91 328
Mexico  86 89 75 76 92 114 77 113 112 110
Morocco  96 96 76 72 70 64 64 47 69 45
Netherlands  91 94 134 232 346 276 316 265 284 332
New Zealand   89 71 67 65 60 355 338 401 271
Norway  86 89 108 112 117 120 156 160 257 402
Portugal  96 94 107 124 133 138 112 82 99 213
Spain  107 100 117 143 139 151 138 135 104 263
Sweden  86 89 123 138 159 180 190 203 319 333
Switzerland  91 91 112 126 145 164 241 280 429 343
Turkey  118 133 106 101 98 96 94 79 77 104
UK  86 89 126 163 203 256 365 322 329 329
USA  86 89 71 67 86 189 280 347 453 448
Authors’s calculations based on Maddison (2007) 
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Table A.4 Global income inequality: Theil coefficient decomposition 
year Global Across countries % of total Within countries % of total 
1970 0.812 0.557 68.6 0.255 31.4 
1971 0.814 0.558 68.6 0.256 31.4 
1972 0.825 0.568 68.9 0.256 31.1 
1973 0.832 0.576 69.2 0.257 30.8 
1974 0.830 0.573 69.0 0.257 31.0 
1975 0.814 0.557 68.3 0.258 31.7 
1976 0.826 0.567 68.6 0.259 31.4 
1977 0.828 0.569 68.7 0.259 31.3 
1978 0.835 0.576 68.9 0.259 31.1 
1979 0.839 0.578 68.9 0.261 31.1 
1980 0.833 0.571 68.6 0.262 31.4 
1981 0.828 0.566 68.3 0.262 31.7 
1982 0.807 0.546 67.6 0.262 32.4 
1983 0.803 0.543 67.6 0.260 32.4 
1984 0.806 0.546 67.7 0.260 32.3 
1985 0.809 0.549 67.8 0.261 32.2 
1986 0.803 0.542 67.5 0.261 32.5 
1987 0.803 0.542 67.5 0.261 32.5 
1988 0.808 0.548 67.8 0.260 32.2 
1989 0.820 0.559 68.2 0.261 31.8 
1990 0.818 0.557 68.1 0.261 31.9 
1991 0.807 0.542 67.2 0.264 32.8 
1992 0.800 0.533 66.6 0.267 33.4 
1993 0.787 0.518 65.8 0.269 34.2 
1994 0.789 0.517 65.5 0.272 34.5 
1995 0.784 0.511 65.1 0.273 34.9 
1996 0.779 0.504 64.7 0.275 35.3 
1997 0.782 0.505 64.5 0.277 35.5 
1998 0.785 0.506 64.4 0.279 35.6 
1999 0.787 0.506 64.3 0.281 35.7 
2000 0.783 0.499 63.8 0.284 36.2 
Source: Sala-i-Martin (2006) 
 
 
